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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
parently, the entire arrangement for the purchase of the timber
from the landowner was the result of negotiations carried on
exclusively by the company; that McAllister was neither present
at the time nor was he aware that the agreement to purchase
was contemplated until after it had been concluded; and that it
was the company to whom the landowner was to look for pay-
ment. Unfortunately, the court did not see fit to devote any por-
tion of its opinion to an explanation of how McAllister acquired
ownership. 12
It would appear that the result reached in the present case
could more easily be justified on the ground that the work which
was performed was not a part of the regular business of the
Gross and Janes Tie Company.13 Section 1, Subsection 2, of the
Workmen's Compensation Act requires that an employee must
show as a condition precedent to recovery that he was perform-
ing services "in the course of his employer's trade, business, or
occupation." This same requirement has been made a part of
Section 6 of the act.14 Since there was uncontradicted evidence
in the record to show that the tie company was not engaged in
the business of manufacturing ties, but rather its business was
confined to the purchase of manufactured ties, recovery could
have been denied on this basis.
WILTON H. WILLIAMS, JR.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE-REsPONSIVE VERDICTs-Under
a bill of information charging defendant with the crime of ag-
gravated arson, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of "simple
arson in the sum of $150." Held, simple arson is not responsive
to a charge of aggravated arson because it is not an included of-
fense, as required by Article 386 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure of 1928 as amended by Act 147 of 1942. Motion in arrest of
judgment sustained. State v. Murphy, 38 So. (2d) 254 (La. 1948).
At the time of the trial, Act 161 of 1948 amending Article
12. The court did find that the original purchase agreement was not
binding upon the tie company or the landowner and that therefore title to
the ties did not vest in the company until they were cut and delivered by
McAllister, but, as far as this writer can discover, it never did explain how
it found that McAllister became owner of the ties prior to the time he de-
livered them to the company.
13. Instead the court said, "the sole issue before us is whether, on the
basis of these facts, McAllister was in truth an employee or a contractor of
Gross and Janes Company. If the facts justify such an answer, then, un-
questionably, the defendant, as the insurance carrier of Gross and Janes,
is clearly liable for compensation." 33 So.(2d) 575, 576.
14. Horrell v. Gulf and Valley Cotton Oil Company, Inc., 131 So. 709 (La.
App. 1930); Wilson v. Roberts, 194 So. 88 (La. App. 1940).
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386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was not yet in effect. Thus
the court on appeal very properly decided the case on the "lesser
included offense" theory of responsive verdicts which had de-
veloped under Article 386 before the recent amendment. It was
a well-established principle that all the elements of the lesser
crime must necessarily be included in the definition of the greater
crime charged in order that a verdict of guilty of the lesser crime
be responsive.' In his opinion Chief Justice O'Niell points out
that "the gravamen of aggravated arson is foreseeable danger to
human life; whereas the gravamen of the offense of simple arson
is the damaging of the property of another without his consent."
An essential element of the crime of simple arson is that the
property belong to "another," but this is not necessary to the
crime of aggravated arson.2 Therefore, as aggravated arson does
not include all the elements of simple arson, a verdict of guilty
of the lesser offense would not be responsive.
While the rule of the jurisprudence prior to 1948 was properly
applied in the Murphy decision, the result would have been dif-
ferent under the recent amendment to Article 386, which sanc-
tions simple arson as responsive to a charge of aggravated arson.
The scheme of responsive verdicts set up by the 1948 amend-
ment to Article 386 is not based primarily on the lesser included
offense theory. Trial convenience and expediency were the con-
trolling objectives of the District Judges' Association in drafting
the new responsive verdict statute. The specific groupings of ver-
dicts were arrived at through a compromise of two conflicting
considerations: the danger of confusing the jury with numerous
superfluous charges, and the disadvantage of forcing the prose-
cution to resolve possible close factual questions as to which
crime should be charged in the indictment. This pragmatic ap-
proach resulted in the elimination of many verdicts which had
previously been included as responsive'under the lesser included
offense theory.3 In a few instances, such as the principal case, the
1. State v. Roberts, 213 La. 559, 564, 35 So. (3d) 216, 217 (1948); State v.
Antoine, 189 La. 619, 180 So. 465 (1938), discussed generally in (1944) 5 Lou-
ISIANA LAW REVIEW 603. See also Arts. 405, 406, Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928;
Art. 5, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
2. Art. 51, La. Crim. Code of 1942: "Aggravated Arson is the intentional
damaging by any explosive substance, or the setting fire to any structure,
watercraft, or movable, wherein it is foreseeable that human life might be
endangered. ... Art. 52, La. Crim. Code of 1942: "Simple arson is the in-
tentional damaging by any explosive substance or the setting fire to any
property of another, without the consent of the owner. .. "
3. See The Louisiana Legislation of 1948 (1948) 9 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
41 for a discussion of La. Act 161 of 1948.
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included verdicts embrace lesser and generic offenses which were
formerly non-responsive, since they contain elements not neces-
sary to the more serious crime. An example may illustrate these
changes. Where murder was charged, guilty of manslaughter,
negligent homicide,4 attempted murder and attempted man-
slaughter' were, formerly included as responsive verdicts. The
new provisions exclude attempts and negligent homicide as re-
sponsive to murder, for the practical reason that such additional
charges are usually inappropriate to the facts and serve only to
create confusion in the minds of the jury. On the other hand,
manslaughter is still treated as responsive because of frequent
close questions of fact as to whether an intentional killing was
done in the "heat of passion."
In most instances the new statute has reduced the number
of responsive verdicts. However, in the arson crimes, considera-
tions of trial convenience resulted in adding guilty of simple
arson as a responsive verdict to a charge of aggravated arson,
despite the fact that all elements of the lesser offense are not
necessarily included in aggravated arson. This addition was made
because of possible close questions, in cases where the property
of another was burned, as to whether there was "foreseeable
danger to human life," in which case the arson would be aggra-
vated rather than simple.
One of the most interesting aspects of the Murphy decision
is the question raised in the opinion by Chief Justice O'Niell,
when he declared, by way of dictum:
"Whether it is necessary also, in a prosecution for aggravated
arson, under the provisions of Act No. 161 of 1948, in order to
make a verdict of guilty of simple arson responsive, that the
indictment shall state also that the property damaged, by the
explosive substance, or set on fire, was the property of an-
other person, other than the party accused, and that the dam-
aging or setting fire to the property was done without the
consent of the owner, is a matter which we need not decide
in this case."
Some support for the affirmative of the question is presented
by the analogous case of State v. Pace, 6 where the defendant was
4. Art. 386, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928, as amended by La. Act 147
of 1942; State v. Stanford, 204 La. 439, 15 So. (2d) 817 (1943); State v. Malmay,
209 La. 476, 24 So(2d) 869 (1946).
5. State v. Brown, 214 La. 18, 36 So. (2d) 624 (1948), overruling State v.
Bray, 210 La. 573, 27 So. (2d) 337 (1946) and State v. Love, 210 La. 11, 26 So.
(2d) 156 (1946).
6. 174 La. 295, 140 So. 482 (1932).
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charged with robbery and convicted of larceny. Although larceny
was then a lesser and generic offense, it was held that larceny
was not responsive unless the indictment alleged the amount
stolen. This allegation is essential to a charge of the graded of-
fense of larceny, but immaterial to the crime of robbery.
On the other hand, it may be argued that the scope of the
charge is to be measured by the new responsive verdict statute,
which specifically enumerates the responsive verdicts. From the
nature of the statute, it may be implied that an indictment for
the greater offense is automatically an indictment of the lesser
offenses which are listed as responsive. This construction of the
statute removes the necessity of additional allegations in the in-
dictment.
Whether additional allegations should be required or not,
the prosecution is not relieved of the necessity of proving all the
elements of the lesser offense. For example, if the defendant were
charged with aggravated arson and the jury returned a verdict
of guilty of simple arson, a motion for a new trial would be ap-
propriate if there were insufficient evidence to support a finding
that the property belonged to another and was burned without
his consent.7
As a practical matter, the question is of limited significance.
The only other instance under the new statute on all fours with
the arson situation is the case of aggravated and simple criminal
damage to property;8 although rape and kidnapping appear simi-
lar, careful analysis of the definitions in the articles dealing with
those crimes shows that the lesser offenses do not contain new and
independent elements.9 In all other cases, the responsive verdicts
are clearly lesser and included offenses within the meaning of
the established jurisprudence.
JACK C. CALDWELL
7. Overruling of this motion presents a question for review on appeal only
If there Is no evidence in support of an essential element of the crime. State
v. McDonell, 208 La. 602, 23 So. (2d) 230 (1945); State v. Giangosso, 157 La.
360, 102 So. 429 (1924); State v. Wells, 147 La. 822, 86 So. 268 (1920).
8. Arts. 55, 56, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
9. Arts. 41, 42, 43, La. Crim. Code of 1942, merely codify the traditional
common law definition of rape as sexual intercourse without the lawful
consent of the woman. See Commonwealth v. Burke, 105 Mass. 376, 7 Am.
Rep. 531 (1870). In Louisiana the offense has -been subdivided according to
the aggravated nature of the offense, but in all cases lack of valid consent
is a generic element. Similarly, the kidnapping articles require a carrying
away of the victim without his lawful consent. Intent to extort is merely the
aggravating element of kidnapping. Arts. 44, 45, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
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